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CRIMINAL LAW: THE OKLAHOMA COURT OF
CRIMINAL APPEALS' PROCEDURAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE APPLICATION OF RING V. ARIZONA
TO OKLAHOMA'S CAPITAL SENTENCING SCHEME
SETH S. BRANHAM*
I. Introduction
On June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona.'
In Ring, the Court examined Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, and extended
the scope of Apprendi v. New Jersey/ to include the death penalty.3 Ring held
that the Sixth Amendment mandates that ajury, rather than a sentencing judge,
find an aggravating circumstance where it is necessary for the imposition of the
death penalty.4 In so doing, Ring overruled well-settled Supreme Court
precedent addressing the ability of a sentencing judge to make eligibility and
selection decisions in the capital sentencing process.5
In her dissent, Justice O'Connor predicted that Ring would add to the
"severely destabilizing effect on our criminal justice system" that Apprendi has
already inflicted.6 Justice O'Connor cited the large number of Apprendi
challenges that have flooded the federal courts since that decision.7 According
to Justice O'Connor, "[i]t is simply beyond dispute that Apprendi threw
countless criminal sentences into doubt and thereby caused an enormous
increase in the workload of an already overburdened judiciary."8
Justice O'Connor noted that Ring effectively declared five states' capital
sentencing schemes unconstitutional - states where a judge, not a jury,
determines capital sentencing.9 Further, Ring called into question the validity
of death sentences in four other states with "hybrid sentencing schemes," where
* J.D., 1998, University of Oklahoma; B.A., 1995, University of Tulsa.
1. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
3. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
4. Id.
5. Id. (citing Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990)). In Walton, the Court
rejected a challenge to Arizona's capital sentencing scheme similar to that raised in Ring when
it held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to make the specific findings
authorizing imposition of the death penalty.
6. Id. at 619.
7. Id. at 620.
8. Id.
9. Id. Justice O'Connor identified Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska as having
capital sentencing schemes similar to Arizona's.
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the jury renders an advisory verdict but a judge makes the ultimate sentencing
determination.'" According to Justice O'Connor, Ring could conceivably affect
529 death sentences in those nine states alone." Although Justice O'Connor
believed that many Ring challenges would be defeated by either the harmless
error standards or the rules governing collateral challenges to convictions and
sentences that are based on new rules of constitutional law, she predicted that
"[bly expanding on Apprendi, the Court today exacerbates the harm done in that
case"- a case Justice O'Connor stated she would overrule. 2
In Torres v. State,13 the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed a
post-conviction challenge to Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme under Ring
on the merits. 1" The court's review appears premised on a finding, articulated
in a previous unpublished case from the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
that Ring represents a new substantive rule of law that applies retroactively to
cases on collateral review. 5 This holding is contrary to the conclusions other
courts - including the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals - have come to when
reviewing the issue. In Cannon v. Mullin,6 the Tenth Circuit held that Ring
represents a new rule of criminal procedure, not a new substantive change in the
law. 7 As shown below, this new rule of criminal procedure does not apply to
cases on collateral review under the Teague v. Lane 8 retroactivity principles. 9
This Article will explore the applicability of Ring to Oklahoma's capital
sentencing scheme and the procedural hurdles governing collateral challenges
based on Ring that Oklahoma death row inmates will face in state post-
conviction actions and federal habeas proceedings. In Part 11, it examines a
sampling of the categories of Ring-based claims that the Oklahoma death row
inmates are launching, as well as the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals'
responses to these challenges. This review demonstrates that Ring is wholly
inapplicable to Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme, and therefore has no
effect on death sentences imposed under Oklahoma law. Nonetheless, in Part
IV this Article outlines the potentially destabilizing effect of Ring on
Oklahoma's criminal justice system, based on the Oklahoma Court of Criminal




13. 2002 OK CR 35, 58 P.3d 214.
14. Id. 3, 58 P.3d at 215.
15. Cannon v. State, No. PCD-2002-877, slip op. at 4 n.14 (Okla. Crim. App. Jul. 18,
2002).
16. 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002).
17. Id. at 994.
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Appeals' determination that Ring may be reviewed on the merits in a state court
collateral review. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to allow
a merits review of Ring-based issues has the potential to spawn needless
litigation and delay in Oklahoma death penalty cases, despite Ring's complete
inapplicability to Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme. As such, the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling on this narrow procedural issue
has the potential to give rise to some of the destabilizing effects predicted by
Justice O'Connor in her dissent.
II. Substantive Applicability of Ring to Oklahoma's
Capital Sentencing Scheme
A necessary departure point for this discussion is a brief overview of
Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme. Under Oklahoma law, a capital murder
defendant receives a bifurcated trial.2" A judge or a jury determines guilt or
innocence during the first stage of trial.2' When the judge or jury finds a
defendant in a death penalty case guilty of first degree murder, the court must
hold a separate penalty phase to determine the appropriate punishment.22 The
punishment options for first degree murder in Oklahoma are life imprisonment,
life imprisonment without possibility of parole, and death.23 The samejudge or
jury who found the defendant guilty also determines whether to impose the
death penalty.24 A defendant becomes eligible for the death penalty only where
the trier of fact finds him guilty of first degree murder and finds the existence of
one or more aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.25 Once a
20. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10(A) (2001).
21. Id. Under Oklahoma law, a capital jury trial may be waived. See Torres v. State, 2002
OK CR 35, 1 4, 58 P.3d 214, 215 n.12 (citing 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10(B) (2001)).
22. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10(A) (2001).
23. Id. § 701.9(A).
24. Id. § 701.10(A), (B).
25. Brown v. State, 2003 OK CR 7, 7, 12, 67 P.3d 917, 919-20; Torres v. State, (H 4,
6, 58 P.3d 214, 216. Oklahoma law establishes the following aggravating circumstances:
(1) [t]he defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use or
threat of violence to the person; (2) [tlhe defendant knowingly created a great risk
of death to more than one person; (3) [t]he person committed the murder for
remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employed another to commit the
murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration; (4) [tlhe murder was
especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; (5) [t]he murder was committed for the
purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution; (6) [t]he murder
was committed by a person while serving a sentence of imprisonment on
conviction of a felony; (7) [t]he existence of a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society; or (8) [t]he victim of the murder was a peace officer as defined by
2003]
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defendant is death eligible, the trier of fact must make its selection decision.26
The trier of fact may impose the death penalty only if it unanimously determines
that one or more aggravating circumstances outweigh the finding of one or more
mitigating circumstances presented by the defendant.27 The trier of fact has the
option of imposing a sentence less than death, however, even if it finds the
aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances.2"
The capital sentencing scheme that the Supreme Court faced in Ring differed
significantly from the scheme used in Oklahoma. In Ring, a capital-murder
defendant argued that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violated his Sixth
Amendment right to jury sentencing because a trial judge, not a jury, imposed
the death sentence for his crime.29 An Arizona jury convicted Timothy Ring of
first degree felony murder for his participation in the armed robbery of a Wells
Fargo armored car outside of an Arizona shopping mall.3" John Magoch, the
driver of the armored car, died from a single gunshot wound to the head.31 The
evidence presented during the guilt stage of Ring's trial showed that Ring and
his two accomplices escaped with more than $562,000 in cash and $271,000 in
checks from the armored car. 2 The trial judge "instructed the jury on the
alternative charges of felony murder and premeditated murder."3" While clear
Section 99 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or guard of an institution under
the control of the Department of Corrections, and such person was killed while
in performance of official duty.
21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.12 (2001).
26. Torres, 11 4, 6, 58 P.3d at 216.
27. 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.11 (2001). Unlike an aggravating circumstance, there is virtually
no restriction on the type of evidence that a capital murder defendant may present as a
mitigating circumstance. "States cannot limit the sentencer's consideration of any relevant
circumstance that could cause it to decline to impose the penalty. In this respect, the State
cannot channel the sentencer's discretion, but must allow it to consider any relevant information
offered by the defendant." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 305-06 (1987). Hence, a capital
sentencing jury may "not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor any aspect of
a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant
proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
The Supreme Court has recognized that while Oklahoma law allows a defendant to present
evidence "'as to any mitigating circumstances.' Lockett requires the sentencer to listen."
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 n. 10 (1982) (quoting 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10 (Supp.
1980)).
28. See Torres, 4,58 P.3d at 216; OKLA. UNIFORM JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL 4-80
(2d ed. 1996).
29. Ring, 536 U.S. 584, 595 (2002).
30. Id. at 589.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 591.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/18
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evidence connected Ring to the robbery's proceeds, the evidence presented
during guilt stage failed to place Ring at the scene of the crime and failed to
demonstrate that he participated in, planned, or even expected the killing.'
According to the Arizona Supreme Court, "[tihis lack of evidence no doubt
explains why the jury found [Ring] guilty of felony, but not premeditated,
murder.
' 35
After the jury found Ring guilty, the court commenced a sentencing hearing
to determine the appropriate sentence. 6 Under Arizona law, the judge who
presided at trial conducts the capital sentencing hearing and that judge alone
makes all factual determinations required for assessing punishment. 7 The trial
judge must first determine whether certain enumerated, aggravating
circumstances exist. For the purpose of determining whether the death penalty
may be imposed,38 the judge also determines whether the defense has proven the
existence of mitigating circumstances.39 Arizona law authorizes the trial judge
to impose the death penalty "only if there is at least one aggravating
circumstance and 'there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial
to call for leniency.""
Between Ring's trial and sentencing hearings, codefendant James Greenham
cut a deal with the State and agreed to testify on behalf of the prosecution
against Ring.4 During the sentencing hearing Greenham testified that Ring
masterminded the robbery.42 Greenham further testified that when Magoch
opened the door to the armored car to smoke a cigarette, Ring shot him in the
head with a rifle equipped with a homemade silencer.43 Greenham further
testified that while dividing up the bounty, Ring scolded him for "forgetting to
congratulate [Ring] on [his] shot.""
At the conclusion of the sentencing stage, the trial judge found that Ring
personally committed the murder and participated significantly in the robbery.45
34. Id.
35. Id. at 591-92 (quoting Ring v. State, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Ariz. 2001) (alteration in
original)).








44. Id. at 594 (alterations in original).
45. Id. These particular findings were required under the Supreme Court's line of authority
in Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), and Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), which
address the availability of the death penalty for capital murder defendants convicted of felony
murder. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 594 (citing Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797 ("Eighth Amendment
2003]
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The trial judge also found two aggravating circumstances: (1) that Ring
committed the murder "in expectation of receiving something of 'pecuniary
value"'; and (2) that Ring committed the murder "'in an especially heinous,
cruel or depraved manner."' 4 6 The judge also found Ring's minimal criminal
history to be a mitigating factor, but then determined that this sole mitigating
factor "did not call for leniency." The judge, therefore, sentenced Ring to
death.47
In Ring, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that "[i]f
a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on
the finding of a fact, that fact - no matter how the State labels it - must be
found by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt."" The Court found that Arizona's
capital sentencing scheme deprived Ring of his Sixth Amendment right to ajury
determination of aggravating circumstances because the scheme placed the
determination of aggravating circumstances solely in the hands of the trial
judge.
49
The Court acknowledged that Ring overruled Walton v. Arizona,5° a decision
in which the Court rejected a similar Sixth Amendment challenge to Arizona's
capital sentencing scheme.5 The Walton Court had reasoned that "the Sixth
Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the
imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury."52 According to
Walton, aggravating factors were not "elements of the offense" of capital murder
that would require a jury finding, but rather, were mere "sentencing
considerations" that governed the selection decision between life and death.53
In Ring, the Supreme Court rejected that premise, instead extending its previous
holding in Apprendi that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' Thus, under
requires finding that felony-murder defendant killed or attempted to kill") and quoting Tison,
481 U.S. at 158 ("qualifying Enmund, and holding that Eighth Amendment permits execution
of felony-murder defendant, who did not kill or attempt to kill, but who was a 'major
participa[nt] in the felony committed' and who demonstrated 'reckless indifference to human
life.')).
46. Ring, 536 U.S. at 594-95 (quoting ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001)).
47. Id. at 595.
48. Id. at 602.
49. Id. at 609.
50. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
51. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609.
52. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638, 640-41 (1989)).
53. Id.
54. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
[Vol. 56:365
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Ring, a jury not a judge must find aggravating circumstances to exist beyond a
reasonable doubt.55
Seizing on this new decision, Oklahoma death row inmates have launched
several categories of Ring-based claims over the past several months. The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has consistently rejected these claims,
finding that Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme fully complies with Ring.
In Torres v. State, the court addressed, on the merits, the defendant's claims that
(1) Ring prohibited reweighing by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
after invalidating an aggravating circumstance on appeal; and (2) because the
weighing process is a substantive element of capital murder, Oklahoma's capital
sentencing scheme is invalid because it fails to require jurors to find that
aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances beyond a
reasonable doubt.56 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected these
claims, reasoning that:
Ring describes a substantive element of a capital offense as one
which makes an increase in authorized punishment contingent on a
finding of fact. Using this description, the substantive element of
capital murder in Oklahoma is the jury's finding of the aggravating
circumstance necessary to support a capital sentence. It is that
finding, not the weighing of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances, that authorizesjurors to consider imposing a sentence
of death. That is, the increase in punishment from life imprisonment
without parole to the death penalty is contingent on the factual
finding of an aggravating circumstance. Oklahoma's provision that
jurors make the factual finding of an aggravating circumstance
beyond a reasonable doubt is all that Ring requires. Once that
finding is made, the substantive elements of the capital crime are
satisfied.57
Because Oklahoma's scheme requires the jury, not the trial court, to make
findings of fact as to whether an aggravating circumstance exists beyond a
reasonable doubt, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that the
55. Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. Ring would presumably not apply, however, in the event a
defendant waived jury trial as allowed under 21 OKLA. STAT. § 701.10(B). See McElmurry v.
State, 2002 OK CR 40,1 93, 60 P.3d 4, 25 (citing Torres v. State, 2002 OK CR 35, 58 P.3d
214, for the proposition that "existing Oklahoma death penalty procedure requiring jury, unless
jury trial is waived, to unanimously find existence of at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt before a penalty of death may be imposed, is in accord
with [Ring v. Arizona]")."
56. Torres v. State, 2002 OK CR 35, 1 1-7, 58 P.3d 214, 215-16.
57. Id. TI 6-7, 58 P.3d at 216 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
2003]
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weighing process is sound and that the court did not engage in forbidden fact
finding when conducting appellate reweighing. The court noted that "[t]he jury
has already found the substantive facts - the existence of aggravating
circumstances - and this Court does not substitute its judgment for that of the
jury's regarding that finding when reweighing."' 8
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals rejected related post-conviction
challenges in Brown v. State.59 In Brown, the defendant challenged a jury
finding of the "avoid arrest or prosecution" aggravating circumstance.' Under
Oklahoma law, this aggravator requires proof of a predicate crime, separate from
the murder, for which the defendant was attempting to avoid prosecution.6
Brown argued that the lack of a jury finding that he committed the murder
during the course of Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon beyond a reasonable
doubt caused this aggravator to be constitutionally infirm.62 The court found
that "Ring does not require that we further define and increase the standards for
a jury to find the 'avoid lawful arrest or prosecution' aggravating circum-
stance."" Rather, all that is required under Ring is that the jury make the
determination whether the alleged aggravating circumstance(s) exist beyond a
reasonable doubt.' Because Brown's jury found the existence of the "avoid
arrest or prosecution" aggravator, and because there was evidence in the record
to support the jury's finding of this aggravator, Brown was not entitled to relief
under Ring.65
The court also rejected Brown's claim that he was entitled to relief under
Ring because his jury did not make the culpability assessments required by
Enmund v. Florida and Tison v. Arizona for death sentences based upon felony
murder convictions.' The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals had previously
made the Enmund/Tison culpability assessments in Brown's case on direct
appeal.67 The court found that Ring did not prohibit a court finding of the
Enmund/Tison culpability requirements.' The court reasoned that the Supreme
Court had previously described the Enmund/Tison determination as a substantive
limitation on sentencing that does not make a defendant eligible for the death
58. Id.
59. 2003 OK CR 7,63 P.2d 917.
60. Id. Tl 2, 6, 67 P.3d at 918-19.
61. Id. 16, 67 P.3d at 919.
62. Id. 116, 8, 67 P.3d at 919.
63. Id. 17, 67 P.3d at 919.
64. Id.
65. Id. 18, 67 P.3d at 919.
66. Id. I 9-13, 67 P.3d at 919-20.
67. Id. 9, 67 P.3d at 919.
68. Id. 13, 67 P.3d at 920.
[Vol. 56:365
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penalty.69 Because this determination is "a limiting factor, not an enhancing
factor," Ring did not prohibit a court from making the Enmund/rison
determination.7"
The court's substantive analysis of these Ring-based claims appears sound for
the following reasons. First, Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme, unlike
Arizona's, requires a jury finding of alleged aggravating circumstances
necessary to make a defendant eligible for the death penalty where jury trial is
not waived.7' Further, Ring's claim before the Supreme Court was "tightly
delineated" in that it did not make a Sixth Amendment claim with respect to
mitigating circumstances, did not challenge the ability of ajudge under the Sixth
Amendment to make the ultimate determination whether to impose the death
penalty, and did not question the ability of an appellate court to reweigh
aggravating and mitigating circumstances after that court invalidated an
aggravating circumstance.72 It is little surprise, therefore, that the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals has interpreted Ring to require nothing more than a
jury finding of aggravating circumstances.
The soundness of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' adjudication of
Ring-based claims is supported by the Tenth Circuit's previous rejection of
habeas attacks on Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme based on Apprendi.
In Hawkins v. Mullin,73 a Tenth Circuit panel found that Apprendi failed to cast
doubt on the validity of the court's prior decisions approving the use of
"unadjudicated act evidence" to prove Oklahoma's "continuing threat"
aggravator.7" The Tenth Circuit made its decision in Hawkins because
Oklahoma law requires the prosecution to charge and prove to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt the existence of at least one aggravating factor.7' According
to the court, "[t]hose requirements satisfy Apprendi.76  The court then
specifically rejected Hawkins's claim thatApprendi required the State to prove,
beyond a reasonable doubt, the evidence it presents in support of the "continuing
threat" aggravator.77 Considering the Tenth Circuit's specific finding in Cannon
v. Mullin that Ring is merely an extension of Apprendi to the capital sentencing
69. Id. 11-12, 67 P.3d at 919-20.
70. Id. 1 12, 67 P.3d at 920.
71. 21 OKLA. STAT. §§ 701.10(A), 701.11 (2001).
72. Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4.
73. 291 F.3d 658 (10th Cir. 2002).
74. Id. at 677-78.
75. Id. at 678.
76. Id. at 678.
77. Id.
2003]
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context, 78 the soundness of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' substan-
tive treatment of Ring-based challenges can hardly be denied.
III. Procedural Inapplicability of Ring to Oklahoma
Post-Conviction Challenges
Less clear, however, is the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' consistent
finding that death row inmates may pursue challenges based on Ring on
collateral review. The court's approach disregards well-established principles
that govern the retroactive application of new constitutional rules of criminal
procedure to Oklahoma post-conviction cases. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals should not reach the merits of Ring-based claims raised for the first
time in a post-conviction application. As discussed below, the court's
willingness to review these claims on the merits, as opposed to finding them
barred from review, will give rise to needless litigation and delay in both state
and federal death penalty proceedings. This is unnecessary considering the
federal courts' unwillingness to allow merits review of Apprendi-based claims
on collateral review.
Under Oklahoma law, post-conviction relief is clearly a form of collateral
review.79 The terms "post-conviction review" and "collateral review" generally
apply to any challenge made after a defendant's state conviction has become
final.8" The Supreme Court, in Teague v. Lane, held that courts cannot
retroactively apply new constitutional rules of criminal procedure to collateral
challenges unless they place "'certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe,"'
or define "watershed rules" that "require[] the observance of 'those procedures
that.., are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.""'' The Tenth Circuit
has noted that "[t]o qualify as a watershed rule of criminal procedure, the rule
must ... improve the accuracy with which defendants are convicted or acquitted,
[and] 'alter [the Court's] understanding of the bedrock procedural elements
essential to the fairness of a proceeding.'" 8 2 The Tenth Circuit further noted that
78. 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10th Cir. 2002) ("It is clear, however, that Ring is simply an
extension of Apprendi to the death penalty context.").
79. Ferrell v. State, 1995 OK CR 54, 1 6, 902 P.2d 1113, 1114.
80. The Tenth Circuit has found that a state court conviction becomes final for purposes
of federal habeas review "after the United States Supreme Court has denied review, or, if no
petition for certiorari is filed, after the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court has passed." Locke v. Saffie, 237 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rhine v.
Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999)); see also U.S. SUP. CT. R. 13.
81. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,311 (1989) (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 692-93 (1987)).
82. United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1218-19 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Sawyer v.
[Vol. 56:365
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"'watershed rules' are on the magnitude of the rule announced in Gideon v.
Wainwright."8 3 In Bousley v. United States,s however, the Supreme Court noted
that "Teague by its terms applies only to procedural rules" and therefore did not
apply to bar retroactive application of substantive interpretations of criminal
statutes.8 5
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has adopted the Teague
retroactivity principles as a matter of state law and, consistent with Bousley, has
found that Teague does not bar retroactive application of substantive
interpretations of state criminal statutes.86 In Cannon v. State, an unpublished
decision, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals found that Ring was a new
rule of constitutional law that applied retroactively to cases on post-conviction
review.87 Citing Bousley, the court reasoned that "[als a new substantive rule
of law, Ring applies retroactively to this case on collateral review."8' To date,
this constitutes the fullest explanation for the court's decision to provide merits
review of Ring-based claims raised for the first time on post-conviction review.
In Torres, the first published post-conviction decision from the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals that squarely addresses Ring, the court cited only to title 22,
section 1089(D)(9) of the Oklahoma Statutes to support its finding that the
merits of a Ring claim can be reviewed on post-conviction. 9 Section
1089(D)(9) explains when the legal basis of a claim is "previously unavailable"
to a defendant such that he can raise the claim for the first time in a post-
conviction relief application.' ° In footnote 14 of Cannon, however, the court
Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)).
83. Id. at 1219.
84. 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
85. Id. at 620.
86. Burleson v. Saffle, 20020K CR 15,13 n.10, 46 P.3d 150, 151 n.10 (citing Ferrell v.
State, 1995 OK CR 54, 5,902 P.2d 1113, 1114 and Thomas v. State, 1994 OK CR 85,1 13,
888 P.2d 522, 527).
87. Cannon v. State, No. PCD-2002-877, slip op. at 4 n.14 (Okla. Crim. App. Jul. 18,
2002).
88. Id.
89. Torres v. State, 2002 OK CR 35,12 n.6, 58 P.3d 214, 215 n.6.
90. Section 1089(D)(9) provides that the legal basis of a claim was previously unavailable
if it
(a) was not recognized by or could not have been reasonably formulated from a
final decision of the United States Supreme Court, a court of appeals of the United
States, or a court of appellate jurisdiction of this state on or before that date, or (b)
is a new rule of constitutional law that was given retroactive effect by the United
States Supreme Court or a court of appellate jurisdiction of this state and had not
been announced on or before that date.
22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(9) (2001). Under the Oklahoma Post-Conviction Procedures Act,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may not consider the merits of a claim in either an
initial or subsequent post-conviction application unless the defendant can establish that the legal
2003]
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also cited section 1089(D)(9) as authority for its decision to review the merits
of Cannon's Ring claim.91 The court followed its statutory citation with a
statement that: (1) "Ring sets forth a new rule of law which could not have been
previously formulated from either this Court's decisions or those of the United
States Supreme Court" because it overruled Walton; and (2) Ring represents a
new rule of substantive law that applied retroactively to Cannon's case on
collateral review pursuant to Bousley.92
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' statement that Ring represents a
new rule of substantive law applicable on post-conviction review contradicts the
findings of nearly every federal circuit court that has reviewed Apprendi- and
Ring-based claims. For example, in Cannon v. Mullin,93 the Tenth Circuit
rejected a habeus petitioner's attempt to file a second or successive federal
habeas petition so he could present a Ring claim.' Under the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Cannon could only file a second
or successive federal habeas petition if he met the requirements of 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b), a provision that severely restricts the ability of a state prisoner to bring
second or successive federal habeas petitions attacking his or her state-court
convictions and sentences.95 The Tenth Circuit specifically rejected Cannon's
claim that the Supreme Court had made Ring retroactive to cases on collateral
review.96 The court also specifically rejected Cannon's argument that Ring
announced a new rule of substantive criminal law that, under Bousley, rendered
Ring retroactive for purposes of collateral review.97 The court found that Ring
merely extended Apprendi and, because of the court's previous holding that
or factual basis of the claim was previously unavailable. Id.; id.§ 1089(C)(1), (D)(8). In
addition to showing that the legal or factual basis of the claim was previously unavailable,
section 1089(C) requires a defendant show that his post-conviction claims "[s]upport a
conclusion either that the outcome of the trial would have been different but for the errors or
that the defendant is factually innocent." Id. § 1089(C)(2).
91. Cannon, No. PCD-2002-877, slip op. at 4 n.14.
92. Id.
93. 297 F.3d 989 (10th Cir. 2002). Note that Cannon v. Mullin involves the same
defendant who filed the state post-conviction application in Cannon v. State, No. PCD-2002-
877, the case discussed above. Both cases were filed on the eve of Cannon's execution in an
attempt to win a stay of execution. Cannon lost both bids, however, and was executed as
scheduled on July 23, 2002.
94. Id. at 992.
95. Under § 2244(b)(2), a claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus
application that is based on a new rule of constitutional law and that was not presented in a prior
application "shall be dismissed" unless "the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously
unavailable." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2000).
96. Cannon, 297 F.3d at 993-94.
97. Id. at 992-95.
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Apprendi announced a rule of criminal procedure governed by Teague, was
therefore not a substantive rule of criminal law.9"
To be sure, the federal circuit courts that have reviewed the issue agree that
Apprendi sets forth a new rule of criminal procedure." Moreover, every circuit
court that has ruled on the issue has failed to find that Apprendi applies
retroactively on collateral review pursuant to Teague."° Justice O'Connor,
citing Teague in her Ring dissent, expressed her belief that "many" of the
prisoners launching Ring claims would be unable to benefit from the decision
because, inter alia, their convictions were final."°' It seems clear, therefore, that
Ring does not involve a new rule of substantive law that would be applicable
retroactively under Bousley. Ring, like Apprendi, constitutes only a procedural
change in the law regarding the right to jury trial on certain elements of the
capital sentencing process. While circuit precedent on the applicability of Ring
to cases on collateral review is sparse, the fact that Ring merely extends
Apprendi should carry the day in all future federal litigation on this procedural
issue."° In this sense, the Tenth Circuit's approach to collateral Ring-based
98. Id. at 994-95.
99. See United States v. Swinton, 333 F.3d 481,488-89 (3d Cir. 2003); Coleman v. United
States, 329 F.3d 77,82-88 (2d Cir. 2003); Sepulveda v. United States, 330 F.3d 55,63 (1st Cir.
2003); United States v. Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664,665 (9th Cir. 2002) ("Apprendi is a
new rule of criminal procedure"); McCoy v. United States, 266 F.3d 1245, 1256 (11th Cir.
2001); In re Clemmons, 259 F.3d 489,491 (6th Cir. 2001); Daniels v. United States, 254 F.3d
1180, 1192 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997-1001 (8th Cir. 2001);
United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 147 (4th Cir. 2001).
100. Swinton, 333 F.3d at 491; Coleman, 329 F.3d at 88-90; Sepulveda, 330 F.3d at 59-63;
United States v. Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 309 (5th Cir. 2002); Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d
841,842 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002); McCoy,
266 F.3d at 1257; Clemmons, 259 F.3d at 492-93; Moss, 252 F.3d at 998-99; Sanders, 247 F.3d
at 148; Jones v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1227, 1236 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Harris v. United States,
536 U.S. 545, 581 (2002) ("No Court of Appeals, let alone this Court, has held that Apprendi
has retroactive effect.") (Thomas, J., dissenting).
101. Ring, 536 U.S. at 621.
102. Comer v. Stewart, 312 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Sunmerlin v. Stewart,
267 F.3d 926 (9th Cir. 2001)); see also Summerlin v. Stewart, 310 F.3d 1221 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Order Granting En Banc Rehearing). The Eleventh Circuit has held that Ring represents a new
constitutional rule of criminal procedure that does not apply retroactively under Teague to cases
on collateral review. Turner v. Crosby, No. 02-14941, 2003 WL 21739734, at **33-37 (1 1th
Cir. July 29, 2003). The court wrote that "[olur conclusion that Ring announces a procedural
rule is bolstered by Ring's status as an extension of Apprendi." Id. at *34. The Fifth Circuit
in dicta has stated that "[s]ince the rule in Ring is essentially an application of Apprendi, logical
consistency suggests that the rule announced in Ring is not retroactively available." In re
Johnson, 334 F.3d 403,405 n. 1(5th Cir. 2003). At press time for this article, the Tenth Circuit
held in an Oklahoma death penalty case that "Ring may not be applied retroactively to cases on
collateral review." Workman v. Mullin, No. 01-6448, 2003 WL 22024965, at *13 (10th Cir.
Aug. 26, 2003) (citing Cannon, 297 F.3d at 994). A week later, however, a divided en banc
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claims seems far sounder than the approach taken by the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals. This is important because federal courts, in federal habeas
proceedings, will ultimately review the decisions of state criminal courts.
However, it should be noted that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
has not expressly repeated the Bousley retroactivity analysis applied in Cannon
when reviewing subsequent Ring-based claims on post-conviction. Instead, the
court has referenced that Ring announced a new rule of constitutional law that
was previously unavailable and therefore review was appropriate under section
1089(D)(9). 3 This analysis appears to focus on the requirements of section
1089(D)(9)(a), finding that review is required under this particular provision
because Ring-based claims could not have been formulated from Supreme Court
precedent at the time of the prisoner's default.
In this sense, the Oklahoma court's merits review of Ring-based claims
appears driven by the court's finding that the legal basis of Ring-based claims
was previously unavailable. The court could, however, hold that the legal basis
of a Ring claim in fact could have been formulated in a prior post-conviction
application fromApprendi, a final decision of the Supreme Court, and therefore
section 1089(D)(9)(a)'s requirements were not satisfied as a matter of state law.
This approach makes sense considering that Ring is merely an extension of
Apprendi, which was itself considered a new rule of constitutional law."°
Indeed, the dissenters in Apprendi called into question the validity of Walton v.
Arizona despite the majority's attempt to distinguish Walton.15 If section
1089(D)(9)(a) were deemed inapplicable under the court's analysis, determining
whether the legal basis of a Ring claim was previously available would then fall
to section 1089(D)(9)(b). Because the Supreme Court has not declared Ring
retroactive, the Court of Criminal Appeals could then find that Ring was not
retroactive, pursuant to Teague, and deny collateral review."
panel of the Ninth Circuit held that Ring applied retroactively to cases on collateral review.
Summerlin v. Stewart, 341 F.3d 1082, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We hold, both on substantive and
procedural grounds, that the Supreme Court's decision in Ring has retroactive application to
cases on federal habeas review."). Ninety-four death row inmates in Arizona and sixteen death
row inmates in Idaho who have exhausted their direct appeals in state court will be impacted by
this decision, as well as an undetermined number of similarly situated death row inmates in
Montana. Adam Liptak, Judges' Rulings Imposing Death Are Overturned, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
3, 2003, at Al.
103. Brown, 2003 OK CR 7, 13,67 P.3d at 918 ("In as much as Ring established a new rule
of constitutional magnitude which was previously unavailable to Brown and arguably relates
to his case, we will review this claim. "); Torres, 2002 OK CR 35,1 3 & n.8, 58 P.3d at 215.
104. Browning v. United States, 241 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001).
105. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 538 ("The distinction of Walton offered by the Court today is
baffling, to say the least... If the Court does not intend to overrule Walton, one would be hard
pressed to tell from the opinion it issues today.").
106. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1089(D)(9)(a), (b) (2001); see also Walker v. State, 1997 OK CR 3,
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The more straightforward approach, however, would be for the court to
expressly apply Teague in its published decisions to Ring claims it believes meet
section 1089(D)(9)(a)'s requirements for review and, consistent with the great
weight of federal authority set forth above, find that Ring does not apply
retroactively to cases on collateral review. Nothing in section 1089 prevents this
analysis and the court's discussion of Teague and Bousley in Cannon v. State
suggest an acknowledgment that Teague must be considered here.° 7 Applying
Teague to these claims is consistent with section 1089's purpose, namely, to
restrict collateral challenges by death row inmates based on intervening changes
in the law,0 8 and would prevent the potentially uneven application of Teague
between capital and non-capital cases.'9
IV. Impact of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals'
Treatment of Ring Claims
It would be difficult to overstate the impact of the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals' decision to conduct a merits review of the litany of collateral
Ring claims now being advanced. Most significantly, the court's decision to
review the substantive merits of these claims will only fuel more collateral
attacks by Oklahoma death row inmates challenging various aspects of
Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme under Ring. Virtually every death row
34 n.48, 933 P.2d 327, 338 n.48.
107. In Pickens v. State, 2003 OK CR 16, 17, the court reviewed a collateral claim, based
on the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), that Pickens was
mentally retarded and therefore could not be executed under the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The court found that "review of this claim on the merits in this subsequent post-
conviction application is authorized by the plain language of Section 1089(D)(9)." Id. While
this language makes it appear that the court is applying section 1089(D)(9)(a), without regards
to Teague retroactivity principles, the court did find in the very next paragraph that review of
an Atkins claim is warranted under section 1089(D)(9) because it is based on a new rule of
constitutional law that, pursuant to Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), falls outside of
Teague's ban on retroactive application of new constitutional rules. Pickens, 2003 OK CR 16,
[ 8-9.
108. See Valdez v. State, 1997 OK CR 12, 1 3 n.7, 933 P.2d 931, 933 n.7 (noting that "the
legislature has greatly circumscribed this Court's power to apply intervening changes in the law
to capital post-conviction applicants" with enactment of section 1089(D)(9)(a) & (b), comparing
these subsections to Teague's holding that "[aipplication of constitutional rules not in existence
at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, the criminal law is
deprived of much of its deterrent effect."); Walker v. State, 1997 OK CR 3, 14, 933 P.2d 229,
230 (noting that section 1089 makes it even more difficult for capital post-conviction applicants
to avoid procedural bars).
109. See Burleson, 2002 OK CR 15, 1 3 n.10, 46 P.3d at 151 n. 10 (noting in non-capital case
that "[t]his Court has adopted Teague as it applies to new rules of criminal procedure").
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inmate can now raise a Ring-based claim that the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals will review on the merits."' Besides substantially increasing the
court's workload, the court's decision to review Ring claims on the merits has
the potential to cause delay in federal habeas death penalty proceedings as
federal courts stay pending federal habeas actions while state prisoners exhaust
Ring claims in state court. Although the Tenth Circuit found in Cannon that
Ring does not apply retroactively as a new rule of substantive criminal law,"'
and held in United States v. Mora that Apprendi does not apply retroactively to
cases on collateral review, 2 the potential exists for courts to hold federal habeas
proceedings in abeyance because relief in state court on a Ring claim would
moot federal habeas challenges to a death sentence.'
Obviously, one of the primary objectives for death row inmates is to obtain
a delay in proceedings that will postpone any future execution date. Any delay
caused by the court's merits review of Ring-based claims is unwarranted
considering that Oklahoma's capital sentencing scheme clearly satisfies Ring.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has made clear that state post-
conviction relief based on Ring will not be forthcoming. Nonetheless, the
110. The effect of some of this litigation may be mitigated by Rule 9.7(G)(3), Rules of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch. 18, App. (2003), requiring second or
subsequent capital post-conviction applications to be filed in state court within sixty days from
the date the previously unavailable legal basis serving as the basis for a new issue is announced.
However, application of this state procedural default rule by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals will not prevent protracted litigation on federal habeas review by death row inmates
seeking to amend their habeas petitions with Ring claims defaulted under this rule. Federal
courts do not review claims defaulted in state court on an independent and adequate state law
ground. English v. Cody, 146 F.3d 1257, 1259 (10th Cir. 1999) (citing Coleman v. Thompson,
501 U.S. 722, 749-50 (1991)). Death row inmates with petitions pending in federal district
court will therefore, after exhausting state remedies, simply challenge the adequacy of the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' application of the sixty-day rule itself in an attempt to
obtain review by the federal courts of any defaulted Ring claims. See Smallwood v. Gibson, 191
F.3d 1257, 1268 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing state procedural default rule as "adequate" only
if it is strictly or regularly followed and applied evenhandedly to all similar claims); Hooks v.
Ward, 184 F.3d 1206, 1213-17 (10th Cir. 1999) (describing assignment of burdens to the parties
for adequacy challenges to state procedural default rules). Of course, Ring claims defaulted
under Oklahoma's sixty-day rule must still meet the AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations
as discussed below.
111. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 2002).
112. United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2002).
113. In at least one case a federal district court has held proceedings in abeyance pending
exhaustion of a Ring claim in Oklahoma state court. This abeyance order was entered over the
State's vehement objection. See Young v. Mullin, No. 00-CV-3 1OP(C) (N.D. Okla. Oct. 24,
2002). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals denied Young's Ring-based claims nearly
seven months later in an unpublished decision. See Young v. State, No. PCD-2002-1045 (Okla.
Crim. App. May 22,2003).
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Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' decision to review Ring claims on the
merits will spawn further litigation by Oklahoma death row inmates who seek
a review of the state court's substantive adjudication of their Ring claims." 4
This litigation will primarily comprise motions to amend existing habeas
petitions that are pending in the various federal district courts. These attempts
should largely fail because of the AEDPA's one-year limitation period that
governs federal habeas actions. "' The AEDPA generally grants a prisoner one
year from the date his state conviction became final on direct appeal in which
to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking federal review of his
conviction and sentence." 6 One pertinent exception to this rule, however, is
found at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C). That statute allows the limitations period
to run from "the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the
Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review."' 7
Most Oklahoma death row inmates with pending habeas petitions in federal
district court will have exceeded the general one-year limitation. Such a
prisoner will be required to satisfy § 2244(d)(1)(C)'s requirements for
presentment of any Ring-based claims. It seems clear, however, that habeas
petitioners will be unable to meet § 2244(d)(1)(C)'s requirements anytime soon
because the Supreme Court - and for that matter the Tenth Circuit - has not
made Ring retroactive to cases on collateral review." 8 Nor has the Supreme
Court actually recognized the myriad of "constitutional right[s]" contained in the
various Ring-based claims now being advanced by Oklahoma death row
inmates. And finally, even if these substantial procedural hurdles were
overcome, the Tenth Circuit's holdings in Cannon, that neither Apprendi nor
114. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2000) (AEDPA provisions providing standard of review for
federal habeas review of state court convictions).
115. Id. § 2244(d)(1).
116. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(A).
117. Id. § 2244(d)(1)(C).
118. The same result awaits any Oklahoma death row inmate who seeks permission from the
Tenth Circuit to file a second or successive habeas petition based on Ring. The AEDPA
provides that any claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus petition that was not
raised in a previous petition "shall be dismissed" unless the prisoner "shows that the claim relies
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the
Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable." Id. § 2244(b)(2)(A). In Cannon v. Mullin,
the Tenth Circuit denied Cannon's request to file a second or successive habeas petition based
on Ring. Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989,993-94 (10th Cir. 2002); see also Moore v. Kinney,
320 F.3d 767, 771 n.3 (8th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) ('The Supreme Court did not, and has not,
expressly made the ruling in Ring retroactive. Absent an express pronouncement on
retroactivity from the Supreme Court, the rule from Ring is not retroactive" for § 2244
purposes).
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Ring apply retroactively to cases pending on collateral review as new rules of
substantive law and that Ring is merely an extension of Apprendi, now bind
Oklahoma habeas cases.
All this will not, however, prevent an onslaught of litigation by death row
inmates who seek more delay in their death penalty cases. Because Oklahoma's
capital sentencing scheme clearly satisfies Ring's mandate, such delay is both
unnecessary and unfortunate. Based upon the above discussion, Justice
O'Connor's prediction that Ring would only exacerbate the "severely
destabilizing effect" already inflicted byApprendi is materializing in Oklahoma.
Merits review of Ring claims by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
will undoubtedly result in delays in capital appellate proceedings. This is
unfortunate considering the consensus by federal circuit courts that Apprendi
should not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review, Ring is merely an
extension of Apprendi and neither decision has any applicability to Oklahoma's
capital sentencing scheme. It is against this backdrop that some of the very
hazards described by Justice O'Connor in her Ring dissent appear to be
materializing.
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